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ABSTRACT
Background
The highly pathogenic H5N1 avian influenza virus, which is now widespread in Southeast
Asia and which diffused recently in some areas of the Balkans region and Western Europe, has
raised a public alert toward the potential occurrence of a new severe influenza pandemic. Here
we study the worldwide spread of a pandemic and its possible containment at a global level
taking into account all available information on air travel.
Methods and Findings
We studied a metapopulation stochastic epidemic model on a global scale that considers
airline travel flow data among urban areas. We provided a temporal and spatial evolution of the
pandemic with a sensitivity analysis of different levels of infectiousness of the virus and initial
outbreak conditions (both geographical and seasonal). For each spreading scenario we
provided the timeline and the geographical impact of the pandemic in 3,100 urban areas,
located in 220 different countries. We compared the baseline cases with different containment
strategies, including travel restrictions and the therapeutic use of antiviral (AV) drugs. We
investigated the effect of the use of AV drugs in the event that therapeutic protocols can be
carried out with maximal coverage for the populations in all countries. In view of the wide
diversity of AV stockpiles in different regions of the world, we also studied scenarios in which
only a limited number of countries are prepared (i.e., have considerable AV supplies). In
particular, we compared different plans in which, on the one hand, only prepared and wealthy
countries benefit from large AV resources, with, on the other hand, cooperative containment
scenarios in which countries with large AV stockpiles make a small portion of their supplies
available worldwide.
Conclusions
We show that the inclusion of air transportation is crucial in the assessment of the occurrence
probability of global outbreaks. The large-scale therapeutic usage of AV drugs in all hit
countries would be able to mitigate a pandemic effect with a reproductive rate as high as 1.9
during the first year; with AV supply use sufficient to treat approximately 2% to 6% of the
population, in conjunction with efficient case detection and timely drug distribution. For highly
contagious viruses (i.e., a reproductive rate as high as 2.3), even the unrealistic use of supplies
corresponding to the treatment of approximately 20% of the population leaves 30%–50% of
the population infected. In the case of limited AV supplies and pandemics with a reproductive
rate as high as 1.9, we demonstrate that the more cooperative the strategy, the more effective
are the containment results in all regions of the world, including those countries that made part
of their resources available for global use.
The Editors’ Summary of this article follows the references.
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The avian inﬂuenza pathogen H5N1 has proven its ability
to pass directly from birds to humans, causing a severe disease
with high mortality [1]. This has raised a public alert toward
the potential occurrence of a new severe inﬂuenza pandemic
caused by a novel human virus strain originating from the
avian H5N1 inﬂuenza virus, through adaptive mutations or
recombinations with human inﬂuenza viruses. In this
eventuality, the timescale necessary for the worldwide
production and deployment of adequate vaccine supplies
could exceed six to eight months [2]. In addition, in the case
of diseases in which the infected individuals are infectious
before the appearance of the ﬁrst clinical signs [3], non-
medical interventions such as travel-related measures might
not be as efﬁcient [4] as they proved to be during the spread
of SARS [5]. In this context, antiviral (AV) drugs represent
one of the crucial resources to reduce morbidity and
mortality of a pandemic in the absence of a vaccine [6–9].
For this reason, several recent studies provided evidence that
the use of AV drugs is an effective strategy for the local
containment of the emerging pandemic strain at the source
[7,10].
The real issue in assessing the impact of a pandemic is,
however, in its global character, and in the effects resulting
from the complex interplay of epidemic spread occurring in
different countries. The study of the global scale of a
pandemic must examine three major factors in modeling
studies: (i) In learning from the lessons of the 1918 pandemic
and the ongoing debate on its origins, scenario evaluations
must investigate the possibility of a pandemic starting
anywhere in the world and not only in underdeveloped
countries. (ii) Determining the likelihood of the global spread
of a pandemic must include consideration of the effects of
human travel. Even if local intervention were to mitigate and
eradicate an epidemic locally, it is possible that during the
course of containment, which generally lasts for weeks, air
trafﬁc might trigger a global event affecting multiple
countries. The air trafﬁc would also alter the evolution of
the local epidemics with the entry of new, infectious
individuals from elsewhere, a nonlocal effect not speciﬁcally
considered in previous studies [7,10], or implemented as
assumed boundary conditions [11,12]. (iii) AV stockpiling is
mainly a function of a country’s wealth and level of
preparedness to deal with a future pandemic; consequently,
stockpiles are very low or absent in a majority of countries. It
is, therefore, relevant to study effective strategies that
optimize the use of the available supplies of AV drugs in
the case of a worldwide spread.
In this article, we examine stochastic computational
modeling of the temporal and worldwide geographical spread
of an emerging pandemic [13,14]. The epidemic model
includes census data for all 3,100 urban areas studied and
airline trafﬁc ﬂow between those regions, all of which
accounts for 99% of airline trafﬁc worldwide. Such detailed
information allows for the study of a pandemic originating
anywhere in the world. We ﬁrst investigate the pandemic
evolution on a global scale in the absence of containment
strategies, studying the effect of different initial conditions
and virus infectiousness, quantiﬁed by the basic reproductive
number R0. This preliminary analysis allows us to outline a set
of baseline cases to contrast with different intervention
scenarios. We ﬁrst analyse the effect of travel restrictions on
the overall evolution of the pandemic, and then consider the
best-case scenario in which each hit country can rely on
massive AV stockpiles. We also investigate the effect of
traveling patterns on the occurrence of a global outbreak
affecting a large number of countries worldwide even if an
effective mitigation of the epidemic is achieved in the hit
populations. Finally, with the aim of designing realistic
scenarios concerning AV stockpiles, we take into consider-
ation that the amount of available supplies is ﬁnite and
concentrated in a limited number of countries. We therefore
contrast uncooperative intervention strategies, in which
prepared countries use their stockpiles only within their
own borders, against increasingly cooperative strategies in
which progressively larger fractions of the stockpiles of
prepared countries are shared with unprepared countries
worldwide.
Methods
Socioeconomic Data
The International Air Transport Association (IATA) (http://
www.iata.org) database contains the worldwide list of airport
pairs connected by direct ﬂights and the number of available
seats on any given connection. The resulting worldwide air-
transportation network is therefore a weighted graph
comprising V ¼ 3,100 vertices denoting airports in 220
different countries (see Figure 1), and E ¼ 17,182 weighted
edges whose weight wjl represents the passenger ﬂow between
the airports j and l. This dataset accounts for 99% of
worldwide trafﬁc and has been complemented by the
population Nj of each large metropolitan area served by the
corresponding airport as obtained from different sources.
The network that was obtained is highly heterogeneous both
in its connectivity pattern and trafﬁc capacities [13,14].
The Model
As a basic modeling strategy we used a metapopulation
approach [15–17] in which individuals are allowed to travel
from one city to another by means of the airline trans-
portation network, and to change compartments because of
the infection dynamics in each city (see Figure 1), similarly to
the models elsewhere [18–23] and the stochastic general-
izations in other studies [13,14,24]. Speciﬁcally, two studies
[19,22] address the computational analysis of inﬂuenza
pandemics. These approaches were limited, however, by a
small dataset of 50 cities available at that time and a
simpliﬁed compartmental model. Moreover, the methods
[19,22] do not take into account stochastic effects and AV
distribution, or other containment measures. In this study, we
are in a position to take advantage of the recent increase in
computer power and scale up the modeling approach to
utilize the IATA dataset to its fullest extent, as well as taking
the stochastic nature of the dynamics into account. We used
the standard compartmentalization in which individuals can
exist only in one of the discrete states such as susceptible (S),
latent (L), infected (I), permanently recovered (R), etc. In the
case of AV administration we used up to seven different
compartments (see below). In each city j the population is Nj,
and X
½m 
j ðtÞ is the number of individuals in the state (m) at time
t. By deﬁnition it follows that Nj ¼
P
m X
½m 
j ðtÞ. The dynamics
of individuals based on travels between cities is described by
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[m]g) representing the
net balance of individuals in a given state X
[m] that entered
and left each city j. This operator is a function of the trafﬁc
ﬂows with the neighboring cities wjl per unit time and of the
city population Nj. In particular, the number of passengers in
each category traveling from a city j to a city l is an integer
random variable, in that each of the potential travelers has a
probability pjl ¼ wjlDt/Nj to go from j to l in the time interval
Dt. In each city j the numbers of passengers traveling on each
connection j ! l at time t deﬁne a set of stochastic variables
that follow a multinomial distribution [13,14]. The calculation
can be extended to include transit trafﬁc (e.g., up to one
connection ﬂight).
The infection evolution inside each urban area is described
by compartmental schemes [6,7], in which the dynamics of the
individuals among the different compartments depend on the
speciﬁc etiology of the disease and the containment
interventions considered. We used the two compartmental
schemes reported in Figure 2. In the baseline scenario with no
intervention, a susceptible individual (S) in contact with a
symptomatic (I
t,I
nt) or asymptomatic (I
a) infectious individual
becomes infected with rate b or rbb, respectively, and enters
the latent class (L). When the latency period ends, the
individual becomes infectious, i.e. able to transmit the
infection, developing symptoms (I
t,I
nt) with probability 1  
pa, while becoming asymptomatic (I
a) with probability pa.
Among the symptomatic individuals, we distinguished be-
tween those who are allowed to travel (I
t)—with probability
pt—and those who are not allowed (I
nt)—with probability 1  
pt—depending on the severity of the disease. After the
infectious period, all infectious individuals enter the recov-
ered class (R). e
 1 and l
 1 represent the mean latency period
and the average duration of infection, respectively. We
assumed that the latency period coincides with the incuba-
tion period with mean length of e
 1 ¼ 1.9 d, followed by the
infectious phase of average duration l
 1¼3 d [6–8]. Both the
incubation and infectious periods are distributed exponen-
tially around these averages. We assumed the probability of
being asymptomatic given that infection has occurred to be pa
¼ 33% [6,7]. The relative infectiousness of asymptomatic
individuals is rb ¼ 50%. If the individual develops symptoms
during the infectious period, he/she is then restricted from
traveling (I
nt) with probability 1   pt ¼ 50% [6,7].
Whenever AV stockpiles are available, a certain fraction
per day pAV of symptomatic infected individuals will enter the
AV treatment, the efﬁcacy of which is modeled through a
reduction of both the infectiousness and the period during
which the individual is contagious [6,7]. Moreover, individuals
under AV treatment are not allowed to travel. Note that
asymptomatic individuals do not look for health-care
assistance and therefore cannot receive any treatment. The
rate pAV takes into account the probability per unit time of
detecting a symptomatic infected individual and the efﬁ-
ciency of AV distribution in the infected area. We assumed
that ill individuals under treatment might naturally recover,
thus modeling a possible excessive use of AV courses. The
infectiousness of an ill individual under treatment is reduced
by a factor AVEI ¼ 0.62 which represents the efﬁcacy of the
AV drugs [7]; in this case the transmission parameter is thus
given by b(1 AVEI). Moreover, the average infectious period
for a treated ill individual is reduced by one day. The
combination of pAV, AVEI, and the reduction of the average
infectious period corresponds to a reduction of the overall
infectiousness of treated individuals ranging from 50% to
30%. In the Text S1 we report the sensitivity analysis for
different overall reductions by changing the reduction of the
infectious period. When AV stockpiles terminate in a given
country, infected individuals are no longer treated (which is
equivalent to set locally pAV ¼ 0).
Given the above compartments, in each city the epidemic is
described by a set of stochastic differential equations (one for
each compartment) obtained in the homogeneous assump-
Figure 1. Representation of the Metapopulation Model Adopted
The model includes 3,100 airports in 220 countries worldwide. The map portrays the locations of urban airports worldwide; geographical data are
obtained from open sources on the Internet and mapped with ArcGIS software (http://www.esri.com/software/arcgis). A schematic illustration
represents the patch or metapopulation model adopted, in which the total population is divided into subpopulations each corresponding to the urban
area surrounding each airport. Filled circles inside each subpopulation represent individuals, and the colors correspond to a specific stage of the
disease. Homogeneous mixing for the infection dynamics is assumed inside each urban area, and different urban areas; subpopulations are coupled by
means of air travel, according to the International Air Transport Association traffic fluxes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g001
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Langevin formulation and coupled to the population
compartments in other cities by the stochastic transport
operator. Here we report as an example the differential
equation governing the evolution of the latent individuals in
city j in the baseline scenario
Ljðt þ DtÞ LjðtÞ
¼ b
ðIt
j þ Int
j þ rbIa
j ÞSj
Nj
Dt   eLjDt  
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b
It
jSj
Nj
Dt
s
gbt;jðtÞþ
 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b
Int
j Sj
Nj
Dt
s
gbnt;jðtÞ 
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
b
rbIa
j Sj
Nj
Dt
s
gba;jðtÞþ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
eLjDt
p
ge;jðtÞ
þ XjðfLgÞ; ð1Þ
where gbt;j;gbnt;j;gba;j and ge;j are statistically independent
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance.
The term Xj represents the stochastic transport operator,
reported in the Text S1 along with the full set of equations.
The model therefore consists of a number of coupled
evolution equations equal to the number of cities times the
number of compartments considered. The epidemic evolu-
tion is obtained by solving numerically this set of coupled
equations, using as initial condition a single symptomatic
infected individual in a given urban area. The time step used
in the solution of the equation corresponds to one day. The
equations also consider the discrete nature of the individuals
by using a speciﬁc calculation scheme reported in the Text
S1. A fully discrete version of the model based on discrete
multinomial extraction for all compartmental transitions
recovers the same results. It is worth stressing that the only
parameters in the models are the disease transition rates
describing the etiology of the disease. All the couplings based
on transportation terms, urban area size, and the network
connectivity pattern are ﬁxed elements of the problem
obtained from real data.
Reproductive Number R0
The key parameter for the description of the spread rate of
a disease is represented by the basic reproductive number R0,
deﬁned as the average number of infections a typical
infectious individual can generate in a fully susceptible
population [25]. By computing the eigenvalues of the
Jacobian at the disease-free equilibrium [26], we obtained
the following expression for the basic reproductive number
of the adopted compartmentalization: R0 ¼
b
lðrbpa þ 1   paÞ.
The reproductive number used in the following discussion
and reported in the ﬁgures refers to the value obtained by the
previous expression and discounts all effects due to season-
ality and AV interventions. An estimate of the reproductive
number in the case of AV interventions is reported in the
Text S1.
Seasonality
To take into account the high inﬂuenza incidence during
the winter and low incidence during the summer, we included
seasonality in the infection transmission of the model. We
followed the approach described in references [19,22,23] by
using a transmission parameter b, which varies in time and
depends on the geographic zone. To each city, we assigned a
scaling factor for the transmission parameter, which is based
on both the time of the year and the city’s climate zone. We
report the complete table of scaling factors and the geo-
graphic zone classiﬁcation adopted in the Text S1.
Results
Baseline Cases
We ﬁrst inspected the baseline results obtained under the
hypothesis of no speciﬁc intervention to contain the out-
break. We considered four scenarios for the basic reproduc-
tion rate of the pandemic, namely R0¼1.1, R0¼1.5, R0¼1.9,
and R0 ¼ 2.3. These values account for a broad spectrum of
infectiveness of the virus ranging from a very mild situation
(due to a potential loss of transmissibility with respect to the
Figure 2. Flow Diagrams of the Transmission Models
The compartmentalization schemes adopted in the baseline scenario (left) and in the presence of intervention with the use of therapeutic AV treatment
(right) are shown. ‘‘Sympt. T’’ and ‘‘Sympt. NT’’ correspond to infected symptomatic individuals allowed to travel and not allowed to travel, respectively.
‘‘Infect. AV’’ indicates infectious individuals under AV treatment, who are therefore not allowed to travel (NT).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g002
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pandemic [27]. While estimates of the reproductive rate for
pandemic inﬂuenza vary considerably in the literature
[3,8,19,28,29], recent studies tend to revise downward large
values of R0 previously estimated [10,27,30]. For this reason,
we focused on the R0 range mentioned above, not consider-
ing higher values, which would lead to a trivially unstoppable
pandemic and thus provide limited information in the
analysis of containment scenarios. We considered two dates
for the pandemic start that correspond to different seasons in
the different hemispheres: beginning of October and begin-
ning of April. Because of the widespread outbreaks among
poultry and the number of conﬁrmed human cases of avian
inﬂuenza in Southeast Asia [1], we considered as potential
starting locations both Vietnam and Thailand. We also
analyzed scenarios in which the outbreak source is in Europe
or in the United States, since pandemics have historically also
emerged in these areas [31]. In the Text S1 we report the
corresponding results for all the different starting conditions
that we considered, including small cities in rural areas where
the close proximity between humans and animals might favor
the emergence of a novel virus (Text S1). We provide video
ﬁles representing the geographical spread starting from
selected locations (Videos S1–S4).
We analyzed several indicators characterizing the geo-
graphical spread, the number of cases, and the time evolution
Figure 3. Baseline Scenario: Probability of Global Outbreaks and Expected Evolution for a Pandemic Seeded in Hanoi
(A) Probability of observing a global outbreak after one year from the beginning of the epidemic, for the values R0 ¼ 1.1, 1.5, 1.9, and 2.3. A global
outbreak occurs when more than one country reports infected cases, while the absence of a global outbreak is given by an epidemic affecting the
initially seeded country only. Two different dates for the start of the pandemic are shown: October (left) and April (right). The average attack rates in the
case that a global outbreak occurs are also reported, by showing the average number of cases per 1,000 at the end of the first year. Results are obtained
from n ¼ 500 different realizations of the noise.
(B) Timing of the influenza pandemic in the six regions under study, for R0¼1.5 and R0¼1.9, for two different initial dates: October (left column) and
April (right column). Sporadic activity occurs when the average prevalence reports (10
 2 1) cases per 1,000, while epidemic activity is defined by more
than one case per 1,000. The average profile is obtained by considering all runs for each region that experienced an outbreak in the region itself during
the time window investigated. The thick vertical line corresponds to one year after the start of the pandemic.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g003
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenzaof the pandemics. While we report detailed ﬁgures for six
main geographical areas as deﬁned in the Text S1 (North
America, Western Europe, Central America, Southeast Asia,
Lower South America, and Oceania), the simulations provided
a detailed analysis at the level of a single country and/or urban
area, as reported in the Text S1. The stochastic nature of the
model enabled us to measure the probability that an outbreak
will evolve to global proportions, thus affecting more than one
country, and the corresponding average number of cases that
it will generate overall and in each urban area. In Figure 3A we
consider a pandemic starting in Hanoi, in the tropical climate
zone, and we report for the different reproductive rates the
obtained probability that an outbreak will reach a number of
countries in the ranges 2–10, 11–50, 51–100, and higher than
100. In the case of a low reproductive rate (R0 ¼ 1.1),
approximately 80%–90% of the epidemics starting with a
single infectious individual undergo a stochastic extinction
due to the low reproductive rate. Moreover, even if the virus
spreads outside the initially infected country, the average
number of cases is very low (not more than ten per 100,000), so
pandemics with reproductive rates close to R0¼1.1 represent
a very mild threat at the global level.
This scenario changed dramatically when we considered
higher reproductive rates. For R0   1.5, the proportion of
epidemics reaching a global scale is larger than 40%. For such
outbreaks, more than 100 countries are always affected with a
global prevalence that reaches values up to 500 symptomatic
cases per 1,000. The timeline of the epidemic impact for the
regions studied is reported in Figure 3B. For R0 ¼ 1.5 the
arrival of the epidemic is strongly dependent on the seasonal
effect. In particular, the Northern or Southern hemisphere
may or may not experience the epidemic peak during the ﬁrst
year, depending on the season in which the pandemic starts.
In Table 1, along with the pandemic attack rate after the ﬁrst
and second year, we report the average epidemic arrival time
(ﬁrst case detected) and the average epidemic peak time.
The epidemic proﬁle depends on the seasonality and the
transportation network, as well as the starting seed. In Figure
4 we report outbreak data (Figure 4A) and the timeline
(Figure 4B) for a pandemic starting in Bucharest. We modeled
a pandemic originating in Romania, because this was one of
the European countries with conﬁrmed presence of the
highly pathogenic H5N1 avian inﬂuenza virus in domestic
birds by the beginning of the year 2006 [1]. In this case the
starting seed is in the Northern hemisphere, and results show
important differences with the case depicted in Figure 3,
regarding both the global impact over one year and the
timeline. In particular, the role of seasonality is clear under
these conditions. For a starting date in October (i.e., fall in
the Northern hemisphere), the probability of global outbreak
is very similar to that observed in Figure 3. A difference is
found in the occurrence of the epidemic peak in Western
Europe within the ﬁrst year for R0 ¼ 1.5, due to the high
trafﬁc connections of this region with Romania. In contrast, if
the starting date corresponds to April (i.e., spring in
Bucharest), the likelihood of a global outbreak is dramatically
reduced, and the corresponding global attack rates are one to
two orders of magnitude lower with respect to the scenario in
which Hanoi is the initially infected city. The strong decrease
in the probability of worldwide outbreaks and in the number
of observed cases is due to the fact that the starting
conditions—both temporal and geographical—are not in
favor of a fast and global spread of the disease, since it
originates in the Northern hemisphere during the non-
inﬂuenza season, thus being characterized by a lower trans-
mission parameter.
Table 1. Baseline Scenario with No Containment Intervention: Attack Rates and Peak Time in Different Geographical Areas
Baseline/
Reproductive Rate
Region Average Cases per 1,000 Average Arrival Time Average Peak Time
First year
(95% CI)
Second year
(95% CI)
Number of Months
(95% CI)
Number of Months
(95% CI)
Baseline North America 1.0 (0.1–2.3) 424 (412–430) 4 (3–5) 14.8 (14.5–15.1)
R0 ¼ 1.5 Western Europe 1.0 (0.5–2.4) 408 (379–421) 3 (2–4) 15.2 (14.9–15.5)
Central America 145 (5–324) 390 (388–391) 5 (3–7) 13 (11–15)
Southeast Asia 380 (321–393) 402 (399–403) — 9 (8–10)
Oceania 409 (378–428) 412 (380–428) 4 (3–5) 8.8 (8.1–9.5)
Lower South America 159 (9–309) 185 (71–318) 6 (4–8) 10.9 (10.1–11.8)
Baseline North America 180 (17–357) 358 (229–503) 2.5 (1.7–3.3) 5.8 (5.0–6.6)
R0 ¼ 1.9 Western Europe 176 (28–324) 289 (170–505) 2.4 (1.6–3.2) 5.8 (5.3–6.3)
Central America 513 (511–514) 513 (511–516) 3.3 (2.5–4.1) 7.5 (6.6–8.4)
Southeast Asia 516 (514–518) 516 (514–522) — 5.8 (5.2–6.4)
Oceania 505 (493–523) 505 (493–524) 2.6 (1.8–3.4) 7.3 (7.2–7.4)
Lower South America 535 (529–543) 536 (529–544) 3.8 (3.0–4.6) 7.9 (7.5–8.3)
Baseline North America 549 (475–590) 549 (475–590) 2.0 (1.4–2.6) 4.7 (4.2–5.2)
R0 ¼ 2.3 Western Europe 538 (455–580) 538 (455–580) 1.9 (1.3–2.5) 4.6 (4.2–5.0)
Central America 576 (575–577) 576 (575–577) 2.7 (2.1–3.3) 5.8 (5.2–6.4)
Southeast Asia 581 (579–582) 581 (580–582) — 4.5 (4.0–5.0)
Oceania 527 (525–532) 527 (525–532) 2.0 (1.4–2.6) 7.0 (6.9–7.1)
Lower South America 581 (570–590) 581 (570–590) 3.0 (2.4–3.6) 7.1 (7.0–7.2)
For R0¼1.5, 1.9, and 2.3 and for six different regions belonging to the northern, southern, and tropical climate zones, we report: (i) the average number of cases per 1,000 at the end of the
first and second year; (ii) the average arrival time (i.e., first case detected in the region); and (iii) the average peak time. Numerical simulations start in October with a single symptomatic
infected individual in Hanoi.
CI, confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.t001
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regions belonging to the same hemisphere may experience a
ﬁrst pandemic wave several months apart, as shown in Figures
3 and 4. This is an effect due to the airline transportation
network, which connects different global regions with highly
heterogeneous ﬂuxes. At higher reproductive rates, this effect
is diminished due to the level of infectiousness of the
pandemic, in which seasonal effects and differences in the
timescales induced by transportation ﬂuxes are irrelevant.
Containment Strategies
Scenarios for worldwide pandemic containment or miti-
gation usually consist of three main factors: vaccination,
travel restrictions, and therapeutic and prophylactic use of
AV drugs. Additional strategies consider nonpharmaceutical
interventions, such as quarantine, early isolation of infectious
individuals, school and workplace closures [7,10,11,32,33]. In
an emerging pandemic, however, the production and deploy-
ment of adequate vaccine supplies would require a time
period on the order of six to eight months [2]. Global travel
limitations, considered a nonmedical intervention aimed at
containing the virus propagation, would be unfeasible since
they are so economically disruptive [4,34]. In the Text S1 we
show that even drastic travel limitations delay the pandemic
evolution by only a few weeks as compared to the baseline
case, with almost no impact on the morbidity, as shown
elsewhere [32,34] (but see also the controversial aspects
discussed in [35–37]). The international community would
therefore have to rely initially on AV drugs, which represent a
viable response measure to a pandemic in the absence of a
vaccine and of other feasible interventions [4,6,8,9,11]. In this
context, several recent studies considered the use of AV drugs
Figure 4. Baseline Scenario: Probability of Global Outbreaks and Expected Evolution for a Pandemic Seeded in Bucharest
(A) Probability of observing a global outbreak after one year from the beginning of the epidemic. In the case of outbreaks starting in April, the
reproductive rate is effectively reduced to a value smaller than one because of seasonal effects. This effect makes global outbreaks unlikely.
(B) Timing of the influenza pandemic in the six regions under study. Results for different values of the reproductive rates are shown: R0¼1.5 and R0¼1.9
for a pandemic starting in October, and R0¼1.9 and R0¼2.3 for a pandemic starting in April. Results shown refer to the average profiles in each region
when a global outbreak affecting more than 100 countries occurs, thus showing a typical timeline of a pandemic when affecting all regions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g004
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenzaas an effective strategy for the local containment of the
emerging strain at the source [7,10].
In the following, we analyze pandemic containment and
mitigation strategies based on the therapeutic use of AV
drugs. To provide a comparison of containment scenarios on
the global level, we considered the therapeutic treatment of
infected individuals with speciﬁc AV drugs such as neurami-
nidase inhibitors [38]. We thus expanded the compartmental
model used for the baseline case, as reported in Figure 2. In
particular we considered the application of different AV
therapeutic protocols as measured by the rate of treatment
pAV per symptomatic cases per unit time [6–8]. This
parameter models the efﬁciency and rapidity of case
detection and treatment delivery. Finally, we also considered
that AV treatment interventions are set up with a character-
istic delay [7]. We consider that large-scale AV treatments
start after the detection of a cluster of 20 infectious
individuals in the country where the epidemic starts and
three days after the detection of the ﬁrst infected case in all
countries afterward (a sensitivity analysis to the two different
time delays is shown in the Text S1).
Maximal AV Coverage
At ﬁrst we investigated the ideal situation in which every
country has a stockpile sufﬁcient to treat all cases according
to the treatment protocol, thus allowing for the evaluation of
the corresponding maximum stockpile level needed. In Table
2, we report the necessary stockpiles (courses per 1,000
people) for each geographical region according to the three
AV therapeutic protocols studied (i.e., pAV ¼ 0.7/d, 0.5/d, and
0.3/d, corresponding to a probability of 70%, 50%, and 30%
per day to have symptomatic cases entering an AV treatment,
respectively). We focused on the threatening cases of R0 .
1.5, for a pandemic seeded in Hanoi in October. For R0¼1.9,
AV therapeutic protocols that focus on a timely treatment of
Table 2. Intervention Scenario with Maximal AV Coverage
Value of pAV Value
of R0
Region Average Cases per
1,000, First Year
(95% CI)
Average Arrival
Time, Number of
Months (95% CI)
Average Peak
Time, Number of
Months (95% CI)
Average AV Doses per 1,000
8 mo (95% CI) 12 mo (95% CI)
pAV ¼ 0.7/day R0 ¼ 1.9 North America 0.04 (0.01–0.15) 4 (2–6) .12 0.007 (4 10
 5–0.019) 0.026 (0.008–0.066)
Western Europe 0.08 (0.03–0.21) 4 (2–6) .12 0.01 (2 10
 4–0.03) 0.05 (0.02–0.10)
Central America 1 (7 10
 4–9) 7 (3–11) .12 0.005 (0–0.023) 0.7 (8 10
 4–4.0)
Southeast Asia 69 (32–105) — .12 5 (2–8) 40 (21–58)
Oceania 105 (29–159) 4 (2–6) 10.8 (10.6–11.0) 0.21 (0.01–0.61) 62 (26–90)
Lower South America 1 (5 10
 3–10) 8 (5–11) .12 0.0006 (0–0.0034) 0.7 (6 10
 3–4.8)
R0 ¼ 2.3 North America 9 (1–38) 2.6 (1.7–3.5) .12 5.3 (0.6–17.3) 5.5 (0.9–17.4)
Western Europe 12 (1–43) 2.5 (1.6–3.4) .12 7.2 (0.9–21.1) 7.3 (0.9–21.2)
Central America 304 (282–313) 3.6 (2.7–4.5) 9 (8–10) 25 (4–60) 178 (170–183)
Southeast Asia 321 (318–322) — 7 (6–8) 134 (111–152) 188 (187–189)
Oceania 367 (358–374) 2.7 (1.8–3.6) 8.2 (8.1–8.3) 73 (60–80) 216 (211–219)
Lower South America 335 (286–355) 4.1 (3.2–5.0) 9.5 (8.9–10.1) 3.8 (0.6–9.7) 196 (176–207)
pAV ¼ 0.5/day R0 ¼ 1.9 North America 0.26 (0.05–1.09) 3 (2–4) .12 0.04 (9 10
 4–0.16) 0.13 (0.03–0.39)
Western Europe 0.4 (0.1–1.3) 3 (2–4) .12 0.081 (0.004–0.260) 0.20 (0.09–0.40)
Central America 24.9 (0.2–102.6) 5 (3–7) .12 0.08 (5 10
 6–0.33) 12.3 (0.1–43.1)
Southeast Asia 179 (133–208) — 10 (9–11) 16 (7–27) 89 (73–102)
Oceania 248 (204–264) 4 (2–6) 9.9 (9.3–10.5) 2.0 (0.3–5.0) 124 (109–131)
Lower South America 21.3 (0.9–92.1) 6 (3–9) 11 (10–12) 0.007 (0–0.027) 11 (1–36)
R0 ¼ 2.3 North America 38 (4–130) 2.4 (1.6–3.2) 5.8 (4.9–6.7) 19 (3–48) 19 (3–48)
Western Europe 46 (5–126) 2.3 (1.5–3.1) 5.7 (5.4–6.0) 23 (4–52) 23 (4–52)
Central America 367 (364–368) 3.3 (2.5–4.1) 8.1 (7.2–9.0) 74 (29–114) 183 (182–184)
Southeast Asia 371 (369–374) — 6.3 (5.6–7.0) 161 (145–175) 186 (184–187)
Oceania 404 (393–416) 2.6 (1.7–3.5) 7.9 (7.8–8.0) 111 (104–115) 202 (197–207)
Lower South America 406 (398–412) 3.8 (2.9–4.7) 8.7 (8.3–9.1) 19 (5–34) 203 (200–205)
pAV ¼ 0.3/day R0 ¼ 1.9 North America 1.6 (0.4–6.3) 3 (2–4) .12 0.32 (0.01–0.98) 0.59 (0.25–1.18)
Western Europe 1.7 (0.4–10.4) 3 (2–4) .12 0.52 (0.04–1.89) 0.7 (0.2–2.0)
Central America 218 (59–298) 4 (3–5) 11 (10–12) 1.39 (0.01–5.67) 81 (33–109)
Southeast Asia 316 (300–321) — 8 (7–9) 53 (30–72) 118 (114–119)
Oceania 361 (347–373) 3 (2–4) 8.6 (8.2–9.0) 18 (6–29) 134 (130–138)
Lower South America 217 (63–319) 5 (3–7) 10.5 (9.9–11.1) 0.150 (0.001–0.594) 81 (33–116)
R0 ¼ 2.3 North America 164 (33–314) 2.3 (1.6–3.0) 5.6 (5.2–6.0) 61 (18–108) 61 (19–108)
Western Europe 164 (45–299) 2.1 (1.4–2.8) 5.6 (5.0–6.2) 61 (23–103) 61 (23–103)
Central America 438 (437–440) 3.0 (2.2–3.8) 7.1 (6.4–7.8) 127 (93–150) 164 (163–165)
Southeast Asia 441 (439–443) — 5.7 (5.1–6.3) 162 (157–164) 165 (164–166)
Oceania 446 (435–461) 2.3 (1.5–3.1) 7.5 (7.4–7.6) 124 (117–130) 166 (162–171)
Lower South America 473 (468–481) 3.5 (2.7–4.3) 8.0 (7.8–8.2) 68 (40–88) 177 (175–180)
For R0¼1.9, 2.3, and for different values of the AV distribution rates (pAV¼0.7/day, 0.5/day, and 0.3/day) we report for each region: (i) the average number of cases per 1,000 after the first
year; (ii) the average arrival time (i.e., first case detected in the region); (iii) the average peak time; and (iv) the average number of AV doses per 1,000 needed after 8 and 12 mo from the
start of the pandemic to fully implement the relative treatment program (determined by the rate of treated cases pAV). The initial condition is given by a single symptomatic infected
individual in Hanoi at the beginning of October. AV treatments start after 20 cases have been identified in at least one country and then with a delay of three days after the identification
of the first case in all secondary outbreaks.
CI, confidence interval.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.t002
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenzasymptomatic cases (pAV ; 0.7/d) appear to be very effective in
mitigating the pandemics. These protocols limit the global
attack rate to a few cases per 1,000 with the use of AV
stockpiles that do not exceed 2%–3% of the world
population during the ﬁrst year, reaching peaks of 4%–6%
in certain regions. Moreover, the epidemic peak is almost
never observed within the ﬁrst 12 months. We do not report
data for time windows larger than one year, since at that
point vaccination intervention should be considered. The
possibility of mitigating and delaying a pandemic peak for
about one year is strongly supportive of the effectiveness of
AV drug use as the ﬁrst form of intervention. Figure 5
displays the probability of having a global outbreak for
different values of R0 for the various therapeutic protocols
studied. Its comparison with Figure 3A shows that the
application of AV interventions throughout the world
strongly affects the probability that the virus will propagate
out of the initially infected country. For R0 ¼ 1.1, the
probability of containing the outbreak at the source is
increased up to 97%–98% in the case of maximal coverage.
The probability distribution of the number of countries
infected changes dramatically also for R0 ¼ 1.5. The
occurrence of a global outbreak may be eliminated because
the AV use reduces R0 to close to one in the initially hit
countries bursting the probability of random extinction. This
is consistent with the results of other studies [7,10] stating
that AV interventions are more likely to contain the
pandemic at the source. However, as soon as R0 increases,
there is a large probability that while the pandemic is
mitigated and may appear under control locally, just a few
traveling individuals may introduce epidemic seeds in other
countries and trigger the global spread of the pandemic (see
Figure 6A and 6B referring to two different values of the
attack rate at the source). In this context, models that do not
consider international travel [33] are missing an important
variable and cannot provide a full picture of the occurrence
of global pandemics.
In the case of high reproductive rates (R0 ¼ 2.3), the
therapeutic use of AV drugs alone can neither contain nor
mitigate the pandemics. The number of AV doses that would
be needed within one year reaches ﬁgures that amount to
20% of the population, with a clinical attack rate up to 30%–
50% of the population in the most affected regions. Even in
the most optimistic case, such a level of AV intervention
would be sustainable only in a few countries for a few initial
months, and this costly effort would still not mitigate the
pandemic.
Limited AV Supplies
The results of the previous section suggest that AV
therapeutic use can be very effective in a considerable range
of virus infectiousness (up to R0 ¼ 1.9) if drugs are available
worldwide for a timely use in all countries. Unfortunately,
while approximately one-ﬁfth of the world’s countries have
developed a pandemic response plan [11], fewer than 20
countries are organizing considerable stockpiles of AV drugs
[39]. Moreover, it is difﬁcult to foresee an optimal level of
supply available worldwide at the start of the pandemic. The
recommendation by the World Health Organization is to
stockpile drugs in advance, but with the actual rate of
production it is reasonable to expect that AV drugs will be
neither available in adequate quantities nor distributed
homogeneously among countries during the initial stage of
the pandemic [11]. For this reason we deﬁned the following
different scenarios.
The ﬁrst scenario assumes that a limited number of
countries (Western European countries, the United States,
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) have stockpiles
sufﬁcient to treat 10% of their own population. In addition,
we assume that only the two countries initially hit by the
pandemic (in our case Vietnam and Thailand) will receive
considerable stockpiles (up to 10% of the population) in the
attempt to contain the pandemic at the source. With the
exception of the two hit countries, AV doses are thus used in
an uncooperative way and exclusively on a local basis by those
countries that stocked up in preparation for a pandemic.
The second scenario, deﬁned as cooperative, proposes that
the prepared countries (listed above) are willing to provide a
small fraction of their own supplies, to redistribute them on a
worldwide scale where needed. We examine increasingly
cooperative strategies in which all prepared countries give up
one-tenth (cooperative strategy I) and one-ﬁfth (cooperative
strategy II) of their stockpiles for international use. The level
of AV coverage in prepared countries thus is lowered to 9%
Figure 5. Intervention Scenario with Maximal AV Coverage: Probability
of Global Outbreaks for a Pandemic Seeded in Hanoi in October
Probability of observing a global outbreak after one year from the
beginning of the epidemic, for the values R0 ¼ 1.1, 1.5, 1.9, and 2.3. A
maximal coverage with unlimited AV supplies in all hit countries is
assumed. Symptomatic cases receive AV drugs with rate pAV ¼ 0.7/d (A),
0.5/d (B), and 0.3/d (C).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g005
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number of courses provided by the prepared countries is
a s s u m e dt ob ec o l l e c t e di nag l o b a ls t o c k p i l et ob e
redistributed worldwide to the countries that experience an
outbreak. In the Text S1 we also report simulation results in
which the donated courses are instead preemptively deployed
in each country proportionally to the population size. The
ﬁrst method is most effective in that it allows the ﬂexible
deployment of AV drugs where there is an actual need.
Symptomatic cases receive the treatment with rate pAV as long
as AV drugs are still available, either from the global stockpile
or from the country stockpile. The difference between
Figure 6. Importance of Air Travel in the Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenza
The two snapshots show the countries in orange that have a nonnull probability of being infected by the time Vietnam (seeded country) experiences an
attack rate of 10
 6 (A) and 10
 5 (B) cases. Results refer to a pandemic originated in Hanoi in October with R0¼1.9, with the assumption of unlimited AV
supplies available. A country is defined as infected (experiencing an outbreak) if at least one generation of secondary cases occurs. Although the
number of cases inside Vietnam is very low, the virus has already propagated out of the initial borders to other countries, thus providing several
different seeds for the worldwide spread of the disease. Maps are obtained from open source geographic data and plotted with ArcGIS software.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g006
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenzastrategies I and II lies in the number of courses available for
the unprepared countries. After exhaustion of the global
stockpiles, ill individuals in the unprepared countries are no
longer treated. Both strategies, however, assume an extensive
deployment of AV treatment in unprepared countries from
the World Health Organization international stockpile [40]
and/or from contributions of other countries, emphasizing
the importance of a timely and coordinated response to a
pandemic emergency. A representation of the management
of resources in the different strategies is shown in Figure 7A.
By focusing on the ‘‘threatening cases’’ with reproductive
rates in the range of 1.5 2.3, our results are strikingly in
support of a global and cooperative use of AV treatments. To
discriminate the effect of the different strategies we must
quantitatively analyze the number of symptomatic cases.
Figures 7B–7D show that for pAV ¼ 0.5/d, in a one-year
window, both cooperative strategies outperform the unco-
operative one for all reproductive rates. The reproductive
rates at which the pandemic is effectively contained world-
wide with the cooperative use of AV drugs is obviously
changing with the pAV and ranges from R0¼1.9 for pAV¼0.7/d
(Figure 8A and 8B), to R0¼1.7 for pAV¼0.5/d (Figure 8C and
8D), to R0 ¼ 1.5 for pAV ¼ 0.3/d (Figure 8E and 8F). For values
higher than 1.9, the difference between the strategies
decreases, but even for a high value such as R0 ¼ 2.3, there
is still a difference on the order of 25% in the number of
cases between the cooperative and uncooperative strategies,
with rapid and efﬁcient drug administration.
This picture is conﬁrmed in Figure 9A in which the proﬁle
of symptomatic cases obtained in different global regions for
R0 ¼ 1.7 is reported for the baseline case and the modeled
intervention scenarios with pAV ¼ 0.5/d. The cooperative
strategies give rise to one to three orders of magnitude fewer
symptomatic cases. In Figure 9B we report the prevalence
proﬁle in some countries chosen as illustrative examples,
among the six regions considered. Surprisingly, we ﬁnd that
the global coverage intervention is also beneﬁcial in the
prepared countries, which beneﬁt from massive stockpiles
under any circumstance: the attack rate after the ﬁrst year is
always lower when cooperative strategies are used. This is due
to the fact that resources accumulated only in a few countries
would not prevent an outbreak explosion in the other regions
of the world that are not provided with AV supplies. The
inability of mitigating the disease impact on a global level
would affect in turn the prepared countries. In addition,
global AV interventions give rise to pandemic peaks delayed
by more than one year in all world regions. This is extremely
important since it indicates that AV treatments distributed
on a global scale, even if unevenly, would enable the
international community to gain enough time to develop
and deploy the appropriate vaccine. Analogous results are
obtained also for different initial conditions (see the Text S1).
Discussion
We have developed a metapopulation computational
model that analyzes worldwide scenarios of pandemic out-
breaks with different levels of infectiousness and in the
presence of different intervention strategies. The study of
baseline cases indicates that for low reproductive rates (R0 ¼
1.1–1.3) the pandemic evolution does not represent a major
threat since the attack rate is very limited, and the epidemic
Figure 7. Intervention Scenario with Limited AV Supplies: Schematic
Representation of the Implemented Containment Strategies and
Corresponding Probability of Global Outbreaks, for a Pandemic Seeded
in Hanoi in October
(A) The stockpile available in the prepared countries is shown according
to the different interventions. An initial stockpile able to cover 10% of
the population of prepared countries is assumed. In the uncooperative
strategy (left), the totality of these resources is used exclusively for
national purposes. The cooperative strategy I (center) is based on the
global redistribution of one-tenth of the resources stockpiled by
prepared countries, which will thus be able to count on supplies
covering 9% of their own population. In the cooperative strategy II (right)
the amount provided for global sharing is increased to one-fifth, with a
corresponding decrease of the supplies from 10% to 8% in the prepared
countries stockpiles.
(B–D) Probability of observing a global outbreak after one year from the
start of the pandemic in Hanoi, when AV intervention is applied within
cooperative or uncooperative strategies. The assumed protocol consid-
ers a rate distribution pAV ¼ 0.5/d, whenever AV stockpiles are available.
The probability of a global outbreak occurring is subdivided into four
bins, according to the number of infected countries (see Figure 3A).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g007
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic InfluenzaFigure 8. Intervention Scenarios with Limited AV Supplies: Global Attack Rates
(A), (C),and(E): Behaviorin time of the cumulative numberof symptomaticcases per1,000 people,for a pandemicstarting in Hanoiin October,according
to different AV repartition strategies and to the baseline case. Given the rate of distribution pAV, the value of the reproductive rate R0 up to which
cooperative strategies effectively contain the pandemic are reported, R0¼1.9 and pAV¼0.7/d (A), R0¼1.7 and pAV¼0.5/d (C), R0¼1.5 and pAV¼0.3/d (E).
(B), (D), and (F): Average number of cases after the first year versus different values of the reproductive rate R0, for a pandemic starting in Hanoi in
October. Error bars represent the standard deviation around the average value. Different intervention strategies are compared to the baseline case.
Different values of AV distribution rates are shown: pAV ¼ 0.7/d (B), 0.5/d (D), and 0.3/day (F). While cooperative strategies always outperform the
uncooperative one, the benefit provided by the redistribution of AV resources decreases as pAV decreases, for fixed values of R0.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g008
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Worldwide Spread of Pandemic InfluenzaFigure 9. Intervention Scenarios with Limited AV Supplies: Expected Pandemic Evolution
Average prevalence profiles expected in the baseline case and the different intervention scenarios under study for a pandemic starting in Hanoi in
October. Profiles for six global regions (A) are shown together with six illustrative examples of countries profiles (B), each taken from the corresponding
region. For the sake of simplicity, only one cooperative strategy is shown, namely cooperative strategy II. Here R0¼1.7 and AV drugs, when available,
are distributed to symptomatic infectious individuals who enter the AV treatment with a rate pAV¼0.5/d. The first 12-month period after the start of the
pandemic is shown. The average attack rate after one year is reported for all regions/countries and containment strategies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040013.g009
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org January 2007 | Volume 4 | Issue 1 | e13 0107
Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenzapeak is attained well after one year, a time period that allows
for the development and deployment of a vaccine. We
showed that travel restrictions, which are both economically
disruptive and difﬁcult to implement, achieve very modest
results, slowing down by only a few days or weeks the overall
evolution of the pandemic. Strategies based on AV ther-
apeutic protocols appear, instead, to be a very effective
option.
We found that AV therapeutic interventions might be
sufﬁcient to mitigate the pandemic for reproductive rates as
high as 1.9 if a set of general criteria are met: (i) the
therapeutic protocols effectively deliver the treatment to a
high proportion of the symptomatic cases (indicatively a rate
in the order of 50%–70% per day); (ii) sufﬁcient stockpiles of
AV drugs are available, generally corresponding to 2%–6% of
the global population; (iii) international stockpiles are
managed cooperatively, with partial and timely redistribution
of the stockpiles of prepared countries. While mitigation of
the pandemic might be achieved by following the previous
criteria, the containment of the pandemic is unlikely for R0 .
1.5. Indeed, above those values of the reproductive rate, even
if the attack rate is extremely small, infected individuals are
traveling with appreciable probability, and pandemics affect-
ing hundred of countries are likely, despite the effective
reduction of R0. Finally, for large R0 (indicatively . 1.9),
interventions based solely on AV therapeutic use are
sufﬁcient to neither contain nor mitigate the pandemic,
which even in the case of massive AV supplies (approximately
20% of the population) reaches clinical attack rates up to
30%–50% of the population in the most affected regions.
The analysis of the cooperative management of AV
supplies in which prepared countries redistribute worldwide
even a very limited share of their AV resources, as low as one-
tenth of all the national stockpiles, results in a global
deceleration of the pandemics whereby the peak is delayed
by more than one year for reproductive rates as high as 1.5–
1.9. The reproductive rate up to which the cooperative
strategy is effective depends on the effectiveness of AV drug
distribution (i.e., the rate at which symptomatic individuals
are detected and AV courses administered). It is noteworthy
that the cooperative strategies are also beneﬁcial for the
prepared countries that share a part of their own resources
for global distribution. The success of cooperative strategies,
however, implies the adoption of a ‘‘global’’ perspective in
planning pandemic containment, one calling for a coordi-
nated effort among the international community and the
World Health Organization, as opposed to a unilateral
strategy in which individual countries rely on their own
stockpiles.
The present computational approach is the largest-scale
epidemic metapopulation simulation at the worldwide level,
to our knowledge. While the model is computationally
demanding and detailed in the transportation and census
descriptions, all these inputs are determined by available and
ofﬁcial transport and demographic data. However, given the
scale of the approach, we have adopted model assumptions
that are worth addressing. We do not have levels of variations
in the virus transmissibility among infected individuals within
each compartment [41]. Population heterogeneity, in terms of
traveling frequency, is another feature that is neglected.
Travel frequency is related to ﬁnancial and economic status
and should be implemented by considering speciﬁc compart-
ments. Finally, we are mainly concerned with urban areas
surrounding airports. This implies neglecting rural areas that
might be relevant in less developed countries. While we
collected part of the data concerning the previously
mentioned socioeconomic features (for instance, wealth
distribution), we avoided uncontrolled guesses and preferred
not to overload the model with parameters that are not yet
data driven. With regard to the etiology of the disease, we
considered a given set of parameters for the incubation
period, the infectious period, and the asymptomatic propor-
tion. While these parameters ﬁnd different estimates in the
literature, it is possible to study their effect by sensitivity
analysis, and in many cases their variation can be absorbed in
the change of R0.
In general, the proposed model can be improved by
considering other sets of transportation data and more
detailed socioeconomic factors such as income and age-
dependent traveling probabilities. It can, moreover, be used
to test additional intervention measures such as quarantine
and AV prophylactic use. Possibly the combination of differ-
ent interventions might indeed increase their efﬁciency in
mitigating and containing the pandemic within a wider range
of reproductive rates. We believe that the present approach
complements analogous studies at the regional and national
level and might be useful in the assessment of preparedness
plans and modeling of emerging disease outbreaks.
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Background. Seasonal outbreaks (epidemics) of influenza—a viral
infection of the nose, throat, and airways—affect millions of people
and kill about 500,000 individuals every year. Regular epidemics occur
because flu viruses frequently make small changes in the viral proteins
(antigens) recognized by the human immune system. Consequently, a
person’s immune-system response that combats influenza one year
provides incomplete protection the next year. Occasionally, a human
influenza virus appears that contains large antigenic changes. People
have little immunity to such viruses (which often originate in birds or
animals), so they can start a global epidemic (pandemic) that kills
millions of people. Experts fear that a human influenza pandemic could
be triggered by the avian H5N1 influenza virus, which is present in bird
flocks around the world. So far, fewer than 300 people have caught this
virus but more than 150 people have died.
Why Was This Study Done? Avian H5N1 influenza has not yet triggered
a human pandemic, because it rarely passes between people. If it does
acquire this ability, it would take 6–8 months to develop a vaccine to
provide protection against this new, potentially pandemic virus. Public
health officials therefore need other strategies to protect people during
the first few months of a pandemic. These could include international
travel restrictions and the use of antiviral drugs. However, to get the
most benefit from these interventions, public-health officials need to
understand how influenza pandemics spread, both over time and
geographically. In this study, the researchers have used detailed
information on air travel to model the global spread of an emerging
influenza pandemic and its containment.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers incorporated
data on worldwide air travel and census data from urban centers near
airports into a mathematical model of the spread of an influenza
pandemic. They then used this model to investigate how the spread and
health effects of a pandemic flu virus depend on the season in which it
emerges (influenza virus thrives best in winter), where it emerges, and
how infectious it is. Their model predicts, for example, that a flu virus
originating in Hanoi, Vietnam, with a reproductive number (R0) of 1.1 (a
measure of how many people an infectious individual infects on average)
poses a very mild global threat. However, epidemics initiated by a virus
with an R0 of more than 1.5 would often infect half the population in
more than 100 countries. Next, the researchers used their model to show
that strict travel restrictions would have little effect on pandemic
evolution. More encouragingly, their model predicts that antiviral drugs
would mitigate pandemics of a virus with an R0 up to 1.9 if every country
had an antiviral drug stockpile sufficient to treat 5% of its population; if
the R0 was 2.3 or higher, the pandemic would not be contained even if
20% of the population could be treated. Finally, the researchers
considered a realistic scenario in which only a few countries possess
antiviral stockpiles. In these circumstances, compared with a ‘‘selfish’’
strategy in which countries only use their antiviral drugs within their
borders, limited worldwide sharing of antiviral drugs would slow down
the spread of a flu virus with an R0 of 1.9 by more than a year and would
benefit both drug donors and recipients.
What Do These Findings Mean? Like all mathematical models, this
model for the global spread of an emerging pandemic influenza virus
contains many assumptions (for example, about viral behavior) that
might affect the accuracy of its predictions. The model also does not
consider variations in travel frequency between individuals or viral
spread in rural areas. Nevertheless, the model provides the most
extensive global simulation of pandemic influenza spread to date.
Reassuringly, it suggests that an emerging virus with a low R0 would not
pose a major public-health threat, since its attack rate would be limited
and would not peak for more than a year, by which time a vaccine could
be developed. Most importantly, the model suggests that cooperative
sharing of antiviral drugs, which could be organized by the World Health
Organization, might be the best way to deal with an emerging influenza
pandemic.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via the online
version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/10.1371/journal.pmed.
0040013.
  The US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has information
about influenza for patients and professionals, including key facts
about avian influenza and antiviral drugs
  The US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease features
information on seasonal, avian, and pandemic flu
  The US Department of Health and Human Services provides
information on pandemic flu and avian flu, including advice to
travelers
  World Health Organization has fact sheets on influenza and avian
influenza, including advice to travelers and current pandemic flu
threat
  The UK Health Protection Agency has information on seasonal, avian,
and pandemic influenza
  The UK Department of Health has a feature article on bird flu and
pandemic influenza
PLoS Medicine | www.plosmedicine.org January 2007 | Volume 4 | Issue 1 | e13 0110
Worldwide Spread of Pandemic Influenza